Abstract. The ubiquity of low-cost GPS-enabled mobile devices and the proliferation of online social networks have enabled the collection of rich geo-social information that includes the whereabouts of the users and their social connections. This information can be used to provide a rich set of access control policies that ensure that resources are utilized securely. Existing literature focuses on providing access control systems that control the access solely based on either the location of the users or their social connections. In this paper, we argue that a number of real-world applications demand an access control model that effectively captures both the geographic as well as the social dimensions of the users in a given location. We propose, Geo-social-RBAC, a new role based access control model that allows the inclusion of geo-social constraints as part of the access control policy. Our model, besides capturing the locations of a user requesting access and her social connections, includes geo-social cardinality constraints that dictate how many people related by a particular social relation need to be present in the required locations at the time of an access. The model also allows specification of geo-social and location trace constraints that may be used to dictate if an access needs to be granted or denied.
Introduction
The ubiquity of low-cost GPS-enabled mobile devices and the proliferation of online social networks allow the collection of rich geo-social information that includes the whereabouts of the users and their social connections. A number of real-world applications demand an access control (AC) model that effectively captures both the geographic as well as the social dimensions of the users in a given location. It is often possible to use this information to help restrict access to a particular set of resources given the location and social context of a user. For instance, consider a hospital where a doctor can access a patient's record if and only if the doctor is the patient's primary physician and the patient is located in the waiting room outside the doctor's office. Similarly, we may want to protect the privacy of patients by ensuring that in case a third person enters a room that is not part of the medical personnel and is not the patient's spouse, the health record should be automatically closed to avoid leaking patient's information.
In addition to geo-locations, location traces also offer interesting potential in the context of geo-social AC. In these cases, the whereabouts of a user and the people she has recently met influence how trusted the person is and the AC decision itself.
For instance, a trace-based geo-social AC policy may ensure that if a doctor was in a contagious unit, he cannot enter the new born unit unless he goes to a sanitizing facility first. It is also possible in some cases to bootstrap the trust of a user to access a resource based on the people that accompany him and the places where they have been together in the recent past. For instance, in a fast-food restaurant, a user who has just bought something should be allowed to access other areas of the restaurant such as restrooms and if she also has her kids with her, she should be allowed to use the kids' play area.
While there are many potential benefits of a geo-social AC model, unfortunately current literature does not provide a solution that allows the specification of such policies which include both geo-social as well as location traces with geo-social cardinality constraints. Most of the existing models support the specification of policies that depend on user location or other contextual factors such as time, type of device used to access the system and the type of connection used to access resources [3, 5, 16, 6, 11] . Given that many organizations use role based access control systems (RBAC) [7] to control their resources [12] , several existing works have extended this model to include the location context [3, 5, 16, 11] .
In this paper, we propose a fine-grained geo-social AC model, Geo-social-RBAC, that allows the inclusion of geo-social constraints as part of the AC policy. Concretely, in this paper we make the following contributions:
1. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed Geo-social-RBAC model is the first role based AC model that allows the inclusion of geo-social constraints as part of the AC policy. 2. Our model, besides capturing the locations of a user requesting access and her social connections, supports geo-social cardinality constraints that dictate how many people related by a particular social relation need to be present in the required locations at the time of an access. The model also allows specification of fine-grained geo-social and location trace constraints that may be used to dictate if an access needs to be granted or denied based on the historical whereabouts of users.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the requirements of the system and present an overview of the proposed model. In Section 3, we present the components that we use as part of the system to model the location and social relations and then introduce the proposed Geo-Social RBAC. In Section 4, we present the related work and we conclude our paper in Section 5.
Motivation and Requirements
In this section we motivate the need for the proposed Geo-social RBAC model and present the requirements that guide the design of our geo-social AC framework. We begin by discussing the types of policies that are unique to the proposed AC model that are not supported by existing systems. Current AC models do not have the capabilities to support policies that contain geo-social traces and constraints. In this work, we focus on a RBAC [7] based geo-social model because of RBAC's well-documented advantages [12] and wide adoption. In RBAC, users and permissions are assigned to roles. In order to acquire the permissions associated with a role, a user needs to be previously assigned to it and needs to activate it in a session. RBAC does not support location constraints and as a result, several extensions have been proposed to include location constraints [3, 5, 16, 11] .
We broadly classify the existing RBAC literature into two categories namely RBAC extensions that support location based decisions [3, 5, 16, 11] such as Geo-RBAC [3] and LoT-RBAC [5] and models that extend RBAC with proximity constraints that include other user's proximity as part of the AC policies such as Prox-RBAC [10, 9] . In Table 1 , we compare existing approaches based on the following types of constraints:
1. Pure location constraints: these constraints only take the location of the user into account, e.g., to access a confidential file, a user may need to be in a specific room. 2. Geo-social constraints: these constraints consider both the location and the social dimensions of the users in the policies. We further classify this type of constraints as follows. (i) Geo-social graph-based constraints which are based on the social graph structure, e.g., to enter into a room a person needs to be in company of at least two friends that work there and are present.
(ii) Geo-social tag-based constraints which capture the type of relationships between the users in the social graphs in addition to the location and social constraints. For example, a child can only access a pay-to-view movie if he is in presence of his parent or a nanny. 3. Trace-based constraints: These constraints are based on user's trajectory and whether the user has been in contact with a particular set of individuals. We distinguish between two types of constraints. (i) Location trace-based constraints: which capture the past location traces of a user as part of the AC policies. For instance, consider a silicon chip manufacture company where even a minimum amount of dust may ruin an entire production batch. If an operator has been in known dusty rooms of the factory, he cannot enter the sterile chip production room unless he has previously passed through the cleaning room. This is a location trace policy as the previous whereabouts of the user determine whether he would be able to obtain the requested access.
(ii) Geo-social trace-based constraints: which capture both the location history and the social dimensions of the users. For example, in a company, if a visitor has entered into the rooms used for induction of new employees accompanied by an administrator, he can also access the welcome package files and the internal directory web pages.
As shown in Table 1 , existing models do not support many geo-social constraints that the proposed Geo-Social-RBAC incorporates. We further consider the following requirements for our model. The proposed AC framework should allow backward compatibility with RBAC based systems and should effectively support pure location, geosocial and trace-based constraints. The model should allow policies for different spatial granularity, e.g., it should be possible to specify if someone needs to be in a point in the space, at a door, on a room or in a floor of a building, in a city, among others.
Overview of the Proposed Geo-social RBAC Framework
In Geo-social-RBAC, the context of users is defined by the following information: the position of the user and his previous whereabouts, the proximity of the user to other users and the user's social relations with these individuals. The system consists of users, Policy RBAC extended with location [3, 5, 16, 11] RBAC extended with proximity [10, 9] geo-social roles, permissions and trace-based and geo-social-cardinality constraints.
In our model, users are assigned to geo-social roles and geo-social roles are assigned permissions. To acquire permissions of a geo-social role, users need to be assigned to it and activate it in a session. Geo-social roles can only be activated by a user when his contextual constraints allow it. Hence, a user can only activate a geo-social role when the current location, his previous whereabouts, his proximity to other users and their social relations satisfy the associated activation constraints.
3 Geo-Social-RBAC
In this section we present the details of the proposed Geo-Social-RBAC.
Social Relations
Modeling social relations is of key importance when specifying policies in a Geo-Social context. For this purpose and without loss of generality, we consider a single social graph that captures the various social relationships among the users. Here, we note that we could also use multiple social graphs services to obtain relevant social information. Let G = V, E be a directed and asymmetric Social Graph, where V is a set of vertices and E a set of edges that represent users and their relationships, respectively. We also assume that there is a set of tags W used to annotate social relations. For each e (i,j) ∈ E there is a set that contains one or more tags W (i,j) ⊆ W that denote the type of relation between users i and j. A tag represents a specific type of social relation between two users such as a manager-employee relationship. This asymmetry between relations is necessary to ensure that some policies of interest can be specified. For example, suppose W (i,j) = {nanny, school mate} which shows that user i is the nanny and school mate of user j, while W (j,i) = {school mate}. This allows us to later specify policies of the type "a child cannot access a web page if he is not in presence of his parent or a nanny". Often, social relations have an inherent hierarchical structure. To represent such partial order, tags in W are organized in a lattice L W . For instance, L W may show that tags teacher and parent are greater than tag student while teacher and parent do not have any clear ordered relation, as it is the case when a child request to watch a movie.
We use the functions presented in Table 2 to extract relevant information from social graph G. Policies in geo-social-RBAC include relations between a particular user and other users in the social graph. A valid social relation predicate S is formed by the functions previously listed and allows verification of the existence of a particular(s) social relation(s) or to verify if a social relation has certain properties.
Geo location and location traces
To model users location and their location traces in the proposed Geo-Social RBAC, we make use of the Open GeoSpatial consortium geometric model [1] . In this model,
Returns the tags of a given social relation, e.g., GetSocialRelation(vi ∈ V, vj ∈ V )= W (i,j) . getSocialDistance : V × V → {N ∪ ∞} Returns the minimum number of edges between the specified vertices, e.g., for a direct social relation returns 1, for a friend-of-friend relation returns 2 and for two unconnected nodes ∞. elements in a space called geometries are modelled as points, polygons and lines. Geometries of interest are given names and are called features, and are defined as a tuple type, name where type ∈ {point, line, polygon} represents the geometry type and name represent the name of feature f , respectively, e.g., a polygon that represents an office may be named office-501. The set of all features of the system is denoted as F. Additionally, it is necessary to establish a reference space that we denote as M that provides the limits of the system of interest. Let L be a set of functions to validate the location of users that take as input the location of the user and identify if the location is as expected with respect to a particular place. L contains operations such as overlap, touch, cross, in, contains, equal, and disjoint [1] and may also contain more refined proximity functions as the ones presented in [9] . These functions serve to measure the proximity between a coordinate and a particular location and may be used to establish how far away a user is from others. While location(u) provides coordinates, a function ∈ L verifies logical information with respect to a feature f , e.g., function takes the current location of user u, location(u), and a feature and validates if a user is standing at a particular door. Hence, a tuple f, defines a spatial scope of interest.
Traces:
The proposed Geo-Social RBAC also considers the location and geo-social traces that users generate as they move around M. A location trace of a user u shows the places that he has visited. Concretely, during a period [t s , t e ] starting at t s and ending at t e , his location trace ℘l (u,ts,te) is defined as a list p 1 , t s , ..., p i , t j , ... p n , t e where tuple p i , t j shows that the user was at the location point p i at time instance t j .
Similarly, his geo-social trace ℘g (u,ts,te) besides showing his whereabouts through time, also shows who he has frequented. We define his geo-social trace ℘g (u,ts,te) as a list of tuples p 1 , U 1 , t s , ... p n , U n , t e . Each item in the list besides containing p i and t j also includes U i ⊆ U which is the set of users in proximity as per function ∈ L of user u at time t j . If at time instance t j the system has no record of the whereabouts of user u, p i =⊥.
To be able to specify trace-based policies, we define a trace constraint Q which consolidates both geo-social and location constraints in a single construction. A trace clause is a location constraint c = α, or a geo-social constraint g = β, that need to be fulfilled within a period of time . More concretely, α is defined by a tuple of the form f ∈ F, ∈ L and β by a tuple f ∈ F, ∈ L, s ∈ S . A location constraint is fulfilled by user u if his location trace ℘l (u,ts,te) , for = [t s , t e ], contains locations that satisfy α. Similarly, a geo-social constraint is fulfilled if ℘g (u,ts,te) satisfies β.
Considering these definitions, Q is defined by the following grammar 1 :
The previous construction allows the specification of policies where the whereabouts and the type of people that the user meets are relevant for making AC decisions. We use function completeTrace which takes as input a trace constraint Q, a user u and determines if u has completed the trace by evaluating each trace clause q in Q and integrating the results. If the trace constraint is empty, completeTrace returns true.
Geo-social Cardinality Constraints
Geo-social cardinality constraints are key to specify whether the locations of a user's social relations should interfere with the access decisions. A geo-social cardinality clause is a tuple c = f, , n, S where f ∈ F is the feature where at least n social connections that comply with social predicate S need to be located at according to the proximity function ∈ L. Based on c, grammar: C ::= C ∧ C | C ∨ C | T and T ::= c | , defines a geo-social cardinality constraint C. We use function peopleAt(u, C), which takes a user u and a cardinality constraint C, to evaluate if the constraint is satisfied or not. When a cardinality constraint is empty ( ), peopleAt(u, C) returns true.
Geo-Social-RBAC
With the key building blocks of our model introduced in the previous subsections, we now present the proposed geo-social aware AC model. We first introduce Core-GeoSocial-RBAC and then extend it to include role hierarchy.
Core-Geo-Social-RBAC is defined as a tuple U, R GS , A, O, P . The model consists of a set of geo-social roles R GS , a set of users U , a set of actions A a set of objects O and a set of permissions defined as P = A×O. Users are assigned to geo-social roles and geo-social roles are assigned permissions. We use function authorized(u ∈ U ) to obtain the set of roles that u is authorized for.
Definition 1.
A geo-social role r ∈ R GS is defined as a tuple SC, C, Q where -SC is a set that represents the spatial-scope of a role (places where the role can be activated). The set contains tuples of the form f ∈ F, ∈ L . When SC =⊥ the role does not have a spatial scope is specified. -C is a geo-social cardinality constraint.
-Q is a trace constraint.
In our model, a geo-social role without any constraint is equivalent to a standard role. Additionally, a geo-social role can be in one of two states enabled, or disable.
Definition 2.
A geo-social role r = SC, C, Q ∈ R is said to be enabled for user u if all the following conditions are fulfilled:
Henceforth, we refer to geo-social roles as roles. In the previous definition, a role r is enabled for a user u if u is assigned to r, she is in the required location and the geo-social cardinality and trace constraints are fulfilled. A user u can activate role r if it is enabled. When u activates r he can obtain all its privileges.
To show the expressiveness of our model, we present some examples in Table 3 that shows how our model can be used in a variety of scenarios.
Pure location constraint policy: A researcher should be in the laboratory (fourth floor) in order to access any general files. Let r1 be a researcher's geo-social role, with location scope SC = floor4, in . Geo-social cardinality constraint(for your eyes only): A senior-researcher can access a confidential vaccine compound formula only if he is in the confidential room by himself. Let r2 be a senior-researcher's geo-social role, with location scope SC = ConfidentialRoom, in and a geo-social cardinality constraint C = ConfidentialRoom, in, 0, . Geo-social cardinality constraint (tag): An assistant in the research lab can only see files with private medical information of subjects if he is in the 4th floor and there are three researchers or senior-researchers (superiors) in the general research unit. Let r3 be a senior-researcher's geo-social role, with location scope SC = floor4, in , an a geo-social cardinality constraint C = GeneralResearchRoom, in, 3, superior(u,x) . Trace constraint: A nurse needs to go to check all patients in their rooms in the last 2 hours before she can sign her electronically the round-sheet. Here, role nurse r5 is associated with Q = ( room1,in ∧...∧ roomn,in ,2hours) and with permission sign electronically the round-sheet. Finally, we discuss Geo-Social-RBAC with Role Hierarchy. Role hierarchy [13] is a feature used by some RBAC systems in which roles are organized in a partial order. We define a Geo-Social-RBAC system as a tuple U, R GS , A, O, P, R H that in addition to the components in the core-Geo-social RBAC, also incorporates the geo-social role hierarchy R H . The semantics of R H are defined as follows. Definition 3. Let r i , r j ∈ R GS be two geo-social roles. r i is said to be senior of r j , written as r i ≥ r j . If a user u assigned to r i can activate r j as long as r j is enabled.
In Geo-Social RBAC, a user that activates r i does not automatically inherit the permissions of its junior roles unless those junior roles can be activated. A user that needs to acquire the permissions of a junior role would need to activate it in a session. We note that this design has several advantages. First, it ensures that all specified constraints are enforced in the system preventing and resolving policy conflicts that result when r i and r j are not simultaneously enabled. Also, it enforces the least privilege principle and automatically reduces the risk exposure of granting access [2] .
We next discuss some related work for our Geo-social RBAC model.
Related Work
Several works have extended RBAC to include the context of the user such as the location and temporal constraints as part of the AC decision [3, 5, 16, 6, 11] . Unfortunately, these works do not allow the specification of geo-social constraints or location traces constraints as part of the policies. Some literature [15, 8] have proposed to include social relations constraints as part of the AC model. TMAC [15] is a model to establish policies that require team cooperation. Fong present ReRAC [8] where decisions are based on the relationship between the resource owner and the access requester. Carminati et al. [4] propose an AC model where policies are expressed based on user-user and user-resource relationships. In contrast, our model considers both geographical and social dimensions of the users for making access decisions. In [14] , AC decisions are made based on the location of the resource owner, the resource requester and possibly other co-located individuals. Unlike our model, their model assumes that individuals own the resources and it is not based on RBAC, making it less suitable for company settings. Also, it does not consider location trace constraints as captured by our model. Few works have explored the inclusion of geo-social context as part of AC systems [10, 9] . Prox-RBAC model [10] extends the Geo-RBAC model to include proximity of other individuals as part of the policy in indoor environments. Yet, Prox-RBAC does not allow the specification of geo-social constraints based on social graphs; in Prox-RBAC valid proximity constraints are based on the type of role of other individuals in proximity of the access requester hold. Gupta et. al [9] extended Prox-RBAC by providing formal definitions to determine the proximity between locations, users, attributes and time, each of which is referred to as a realm. However, their work does not allow the specification of the type of policies presented in this paper. More specifically, (i) the model presented in [9] does not allow the specification of trace-based constraints that is well captured in our geo-social-RBAC model, (ii) unlike our model, the model in [9] does not allow the specification of latices specify partial orders between social relations and (iii) finally, the AC model presented in [9] does not include hybrid realm policies while our geo-social-RBAC approach does. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed Geo-Social-RBAC is the first research effort dedicated to providing a comprehensive role-based AC model that effectively captures both social and as spatial dimensions of the users considering both geo-cardinality and location-trace constraints.
Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a new access control model that includes geo-social factors of the users as part of the access control decision process. The proposed model allows organizations to specify their policy considering the geographic and social contexts of the access requester users as well as that of the users located near them. We have introduced the concepts of location and geo-location traces, that allow the specification of policies based on the whereabouts of users not only during the access control decision, but during a longer period of time such as their recent past. Our model is compatible with RBAC systems and we believe that it helps mitigate information exfiltration threats and helps better control how users access resources. As part of future work, we are working on devising new techniques to efficiently enforce our policy model.
